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Fu-go: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon
Bomb Attack on America, by Ross Coen. Lincoln:
Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2014. 296 pages. $28.95.

The world recently commemorated the
seventieth anniversary of the surrender of Japanese forces at the end of the
Second World War. Even seven decades
later, however, little-known stories of
various military operations are being
published that provide insight into ways
the Pacific War was fought using remarkable technology and ingenuity. This
is very much the case with Ross Coen’s
fascinating book, which provides a
detailed discussion of the use of the first
unmanned intercontinental weapon:
the fu-go balloon. These attacks were, at
the time, the longest-range attacks ever
conducted in the history of warfare.
In his carefully researched and richly
documented book, Coen weaves the
story of an improbable project that
succeeded in launching upward of nine
thousand gas-filled balloons from the
Japanese home island of Honshu to
attack the North American coast in
late 1944 and early 1945. At least six
hundred of these balloons are known
to have actually made it to the United
States and Canada, carrying antipersonnel and incendiary bombs. The intentions were to kill individuals; set forest
fires in the heavily timbered Pacific
Northwest; and demonstrate that Japan
could attack the American mainland,
thus creating panic and anxiety.
Once this bizarre form of attack was
recognized by U.S. military forces,
strict censorship was exercised on press
and other media outlets, which were
forbidden to publish any information
about the silent attacks against which
there was little defense. This lack of

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 141

B O O K R E V I E WS

141

public awareness led directly to the only
combat deaths to occur in the continental United States during the entire war.
On 5 May 1945, a group of hikers came
across a crashed fu-go balloon near Bly,
Oregon, and in the process of trying
to determine what the device was they
caused it to explode, killing twenty-sixyear-old Elsie Mitchell and five children.
The fu-go balloons were cleverly designed to make the transpacific crossing
by using an automatic altitude-control
device to drop sandbag ballast at intervals as the hydrogen-filled balloons rose
and settled owing to the solar heating of
the gas envelope. The balloons flew as
high as thirty thousand feet to capture
the prevailing easterly jet stream, carrying them across the Pacific in as little as
three days. A fu-go measured approximately thirty-three feet in diameter, was
constructed from laminated washi
paper, and was supported by nineteen
thousand cubic feet of hydrogen.
The censorship that resulted in the
Oregon deaths also had a more positive effect by denying the Japanese any
knowledge about whether the balloons
were successfully crossing the ocean.
Facing increasingly destructive raids on
the home islands that made the manufacturing and launching of the balloons
more difficult, and with no indication
that the attacks were succeeding, the
program was abandoned in April 1945.
(The last balloon recovered in North
America during the war was found near
Indian Springs, Nevada, which is near
current-day Creech Air Force Base, the
home of the Predator/Reaper drone
program.) Balloon remnants have been
found as far east as Michigan, and as
recently as October 2014, when a balloon was detonated by Canadian bombdisposal personnel in British Columbia.
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Today’s headlines are filled with discussions questioning the ethics of launching
unmanned weapons (drones) against
targets when nearby innocent civilians
might be killed or injured by an attack.
It is interesting to reflect on the ethical
ramifications of launching thousands
of unmanned weapons (the fu-go balloons) against an entire continent, with
no ability to predict within thousands
of miles where the weapons would
strike or who would be injured or killed.
Such attacks today would certainly
violate the law of armed conflict, but
they must be judged within the context of warfare in the last century.
I strongly recommend this book to
those with an interest in the technology of warfare, and to those
who may have heard of the balloon
bomb attacks and thought them
to be almost-mythical events.
JOHN E. JACKSON

Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War
Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–
1971, ed. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 320 pages.
$10.94.

Few states in modern times have seen
their military beaten as badly as Egypt
did in 1967—and have that military
survive. Even fewer, perhaps no others, have then deliberately rebuilt that
defeated force to a point at which a
mere five years later it could again offer
battle and, arguably, produce victory.
How the Egyptians accomplished this
has been something of an incomplete
and little-known story up to now. This is
mainly due to a lack of translated articles
and writings penned by senior Egyptian
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leaders. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein has,
with this volume, begun to fill in some
of the major gaps in the account.
Aboul-Enein’s book is actually a collection of articles initially published
in Infantry magazine. Each of the
original accounts was written by General
Mohamed Fawzi, the man handpicked
by Nasser to build the defeated and
demoralized Egyptian forces into a
professional, combined-arms military
that could retake and hold occupied
Egyptian territory. Fawzi served as war
minister for both Nasser and Sadat and
was the master architect of the stunningly successful creation of professionalism
in the Egyptian armed forces. His voice,
despite whatever biases and personal
axes to grind he may bring to the table,
deserves to be heard, and Aboul-Enein’s
translation gives Fawzi that opportunity.
Fawzi’s challenge was massive. The preFawzi army was much more involved
with state security than with power
projection or war fighting. As the 1967
war had revealed, the Egyptian armed
forces, even with Soviet equipment,
were woefully inferior technologically
to Israeli forces. The Egyptian army was
riddled with low morale and displayed
an apparently well-deserved inferiority complex. Its soldiery was, for the
most part, uneducated and poorly
trained. The Egyptian high command
was overcentralized, overpoliticized,
and, as events had proved, unable to
exercise anything like the command and
control required in modern combat.
The end of the war both left Israel with
strategic depth and turned the Suez
Canal into a natural defensive barrier
that was further fortified with a series
of formidable defensive positions.
Fawzi admits to having certain unusual advantages in accomplishing his
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